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AN IMPERFECT BODY? 





It is estimated that between 20,000 to 50,000 people died during the Sierra Leone civil 
war. 30,000 people had a limb removed by the rebel forces and up to 257,000 acts of 
sexual violence occurred. The Special Court for Sierra Leone was set up to bring those 
most responsible for the conflict to justice. This paper will assess the effectiveness and 
legacy of the court and seeks to show that while the Special Court is not perfect, the 
positives far outweigh the negatives.  
 
 “I want to prosecute the people who forced thousands of children to commit unspeakable 
acts.” – Special Court of Sierra Leone Prosecutor David Crane1 
 
Introduction 
For a decade Sierra Leone was caught up in a horrific civil war that featured mass 
atrocities. In order to try and heal the wounds caused, achieve justice for the victims and 
come to terms with what had happened, both the Special Court of Sierra Leone and a 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission were set up through UN Security Council 
Resolution 13152 at the request of President Kabbah.3 This paper will focus on the 
Special Court of Sierra Leone and assess whether it will have a positive or negative 
legacy. Due to the limitations of this paper and the breadth of this topic, this paper will 
give only a brief overview of the conflict, the creation of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and the relationship between the two 
bodies. In the second part of this paper the Special Court will be analyzed by considering 
                                                
1 Augustine S. J. Park, “Community-based restorative transnational justice in Sierra Leone,” 
Contemporary Justice Review 13, no.1 (2010): 99. 
2 William A. Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, 
Rwanda and Sierra Leone (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006): 36.  
3 William A. Schabas, “A Synergistic Relationship: The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission and the Special Court for Sierra Leone,” in Truth Commissions and Courts: The 
Tension Between Criminal Justice and the Search for Truth, ed. William A. Schabas and Shane 
Darcy (Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004): 16   
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the arguments for and against the court and its work. This paper seeks to show that while 
the Special Court is not perfect, the positives far outweigh the negatives. This paper will 
hold that the Special Court for Sierra Leone has brought much needed justice to the 
atrocities committed against the Sierra Leonean people. 
Overview 
The Conflict 
Sierra Leone is a former British colony located on the west coast of Africa. The conflict 
began on March 23, 1991, when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) first invaded 
Sierra Leone from Liberia.4 Throughout the war, the RUF and the Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council (AFRC) rebel groups fought against the government (Sierra 
Leonean Army) and a government-backed militia group, the Civil Defence Forces 
(CDF).5 During the conflict horrific crimes were committed, including the use of child 
soldiers and forced marriages of girls and women to combatants.6 By 1999 the rebel 
groups had descended upon Freetown, the capital, prompting the government to request 
peace.7 It is estimated that between 20,000 to 50,000 people died during the conflict, 
30,000 people had a limb removed by the rebels and up to 257,000 acts of sexual 
violence were committed during the civil war.8      
                                                
4 Ibid., 21. 
5 Joseph F. Kamara, “Preserving the Legacy of the Special Court for Sierra Leone: Challenges 
and Lessons learned in Prosecuting Grave Crimes in Sierra Leone,” Leiden Journal of 
International Law 22 (2009): 763. 
6 Valerie Oosterveld, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Child Soldiers, and Forced Marriage: 
Providing Clarity or Confusion?” Canadian Yearbook of International Law 45 (2007): 133.  
7 Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and 
Sierra Leone, 34. 
8 Ploughshares, Armed Conflict Report: Sierra Leone (1991-first combat deaths), September 
2002, http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/ACRText/ACR-SierraLeone.html#Deaths. 
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On July 7, 1999, the Lomé Peace Agreement was created through negotiations 
between the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone to end the war.9 The Togolese 
Government, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the 
Commonwealth, the Organization of African Unity (now the African Union), and the UN 
signed on to the deal as “moral guarantors.”10 Within the deal there was agreement for an 
immediate ceasefire, a general amnesty for combatants who committed crimes between 
the start of the conflict and the date of the agreement, and the creation of a national 
Human Rights Commission and a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 11  A 
qualification was added at the last minute to disassociate the UN from the pardon and 
amnesty given to combatants to prepare for the establishment of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone.12 The treaty proved to be more of a ceasefire than a transition plan for 
stability in Sierra Leone.13 The plan was that the agreement would address human rights 
violations since the beginning of the conflict in 1991.14 However, there was an outbreak 
of fighting in Sierra Leone for a few weeks in May 2000 that was quickly dealt with by 
the government, which arrested many RUF supporters. Subsequently, a reassessment was 
                                                
9 Zoe Dugal, “‘Witness to Truth’: The TRC for Sierra-Leone – An Overview,” in Rescuing a 
Fragile State: Sierra Leone 2002-2008, ed. Lansana Gberie (Waterloo: LCMSDS Press of 
Wilfred Laurier University, 2009): 29.  
10 Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and 
Sierra Leone, 34. 
11 Dugal, “‘Witness to Truth’: The TRC for Sierra-Leone – An Overview,” 29. 
12 Peter Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis,” in Rescuing a Fragile 
State: Sierra Leone 2002-2008, ed. Lansana Gberie (Waterloo: LCMSDS Press of Wilfred 
Laurier University, 2009): 55.  
13 Schabas, “A Synergistic Relationship: The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
and the Special Court for Sierra Leone,” 15. 
14 Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis,” 55. 
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made of the amnesty that was granted in the Peace Agreement, resulting in the removal of 
some signers’ amnesty.15 
The Creation of the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
Sierra Leone’s President Kabbah wrote to the Security Council on August 9, 2000, 
requesting the establishment of an international tribunal to prosecute members of the 
RUF and its accomplices who were responsible for committing the crimes against the 
people of Sierra Leone and UN peacekeepers.16 Kabbah’s letter stated that the RUF had 
“since reneged on [the Lomé] Agreement.”17 On August 14, 2000, the UN Security 
Council passed Resolution 131518 requesting that the Secretary General “negotiate an 
agreement with the Government of Sierra Leone to create an independent special 
court.”19 A UN delegation led by Ralph Zacklin (Assistant Secretary General for Legal 
Affairs) went to Freetown to negotiate terms for the establishment of a court that would 
try those who bore the greatest responsibility for the war crimes and crimes against 
humanity during the Sierra Leone Civil War.20 The Special Court was not confined to 
prosecuting only those of Sierra Leonean nationality; however, as per the Rome Statute, 
prosecution of foreign nationals was limited to circumstances in which the accused’s 
national state was “unwilling or unable genuinely” to prosecute.21 Due to criticisms over 
how other international courts had been set up outside of the country whose conflict it 
                                                
15 Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and 
Sierra Leone, 35. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Schabas, “A Synergistic Relationship: The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
and the Special Court for Sierra Leone,” 16. 
18 Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and 
Sierra Leone, 36. 
19 Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis,” 56. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Schabas, “A Synergistic Relationship: The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
and the Special Court for Sierra Leone,” 22. 
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was investigating, it was agreed that the Court’s hearings should take place in Freetown, 
where some of the worst atrocities took place. The Court was set up to incorporate a 
combination of international and Sierra Leonean law.22 While the Special Court is similar 
to a hybrid tribunal (which brings an international component to essentially national 
prosecutions),23 it is in fact more of an ad hoc tribunal because it is a creature of 
international law, not domestic law.24 
The final agreement to establish the Special Court of Sierra Leone was signed on 
January 16, 2002, by the Government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations.25 The 
Parliament of Sierra Leone ratified the agreement in March 2002 when the Statute of the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone was passed, providing the legal framework of the Court.26 
Under the terms of the Statute the Court would cover crimes “committed in the territory 
of Sierra Leone since November 30, 1996,”27 the date of the Abidjan Peace Accord.28 In 
order to be able to prosecute those who should be held accountable, the Statute 
repudiated amnesties from the Lomé Peace Agreement (and the Abidjan Peace Accord 
that had previously been signed) which involved crimes against humanity, violated 
Article 3 of the Geneva Convention and Additional Protocol II, or committed other 
serious violations of international humanitarian law (crimes from Articles 2 to 4 of the 
                                                
22 That being said, while Sierra Leone allows capital punishment, the maximum punishment the 
Special Court allows is life in prison, which favours international law. On the other hand, 
international law was not adhered to in regards to not trying children, as the Special Court will try 
those 15 and over (it has not tried any children yet). Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra 
Leone: A Critical Analysis,” 56.  
23 Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda 
and Sierra Leone, 5. 
24 Ibid., 6. 
25 Ibid., 5. 
26 Ibid., 39. 
27 Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis,” 59. 
28 Ibid., 60. 
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statute).29 However, the Statute excluded “any transgressions by peacekeepers and related 
personnel.”30  
There are three main bodies that make up the Special Court: the Chambers, made 
up of a Trial Chambers and an Appeals Chambers; the Office of the Prosecutor; and the 
Registry.31 On July 26, 2002, the Special Court32 appointed Pierre Boutet (Canada), 
Benjamin Ite (Cameroon), and Bankole Thompson (Sierra Leone) as trial judges. 
Emmanuel Ayoola (Nigeria), Hassan Jalloh (The Gambia), Renate Winter (Austria), 
Geoffrey Robertson (UK), and George Gelaga King (Sierra Leone) were appointed as 
appeal judges.33 Alternative judgeships were appointed to Isaac Abagye (Ghana) and 
Elizabeth Muyovwe (Zambia).34 The Special Court judges were sworn into office in 
December 2002.35 Robin Vincent (UK) was appointed to act as the Registrar due to her 
experience.36 David Crane was made prosecutor due to his previous work in human rights 
law and the inability to find an individual from Africa with the necessary experience 
(which would have been preferred). Originally the statute setting up the Special Court 
stated that the Deputy Prosecutor was to be Sierra Leonean; however, this was amended 
                                                
29 United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a Special Court for 
Sierra Leone,” UN Doc S/2000/915, October 4, 2000, http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/661/77/PDF/N0066177.pdf?OpenElement.  
For the statute in its entirety, see Sierra Leone Government, “Statute of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone,” January 16, 2002, http://www.sc-
l.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=uClnd1MJeEw%3D&.  
30 Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis,” 62. 
31 Ibid., 57.  
32 Schabas, “A Synergistic Relationship: The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
and the Special Court for Sierra Leone,” 20. 
33 Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis,” 57. 
34 Ibid., 58. 
35 Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and 
Sierra Leone, 39. 
36 Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis,” 58. 
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to allow for Desmond de Silva (British QC), who had been previously admitted to the Bar 
in Sierra Leone.37 
Beginning on March 7, 2003, and continuing for the next month, indictments were 
announced for: Foday Sankoh (leader of the RUF), Sam Bockarie (RUF henchman 
“Mosquito”), Issa Sesay (senior RUF Commander), Morris Kallon (senior RUF 
Commander), Augustine Gfbao (senior RUF Commander), 38  Johnny Paul Koroma 
(AFRC Chairman), Alexa Tamba Brima (AFRC member), Brima Bazzy Kamara (AFRC 
member), Santigie Borbor Kanu (AFRC member), Chief Sam Hinga Norman (CDF 
member), Moinana Fofana (CDF member), and Alieu Kondeqa (CDF member).39 Many 
of the most important indictees and actors, however, had died or were unaccounted for.40 
For example, by the time the Court was ready to begin trials in July of 2002,41 Sankoh, 
Bockarie and Koroma had passed away and Johnny Paul Koroma was missing.42 
This was naturally a very frustrating situation for those involved in the Court, as 
these men were believed to bear the greatest responsibilities for the atrocities in Sierra 
Leone’s war. This had such a large impact that some even called for the Court to be 
disbanded.	  43 There were concerns over the length of the proceedings, so in March 2004 
the Special Court re-issued joint indictments for the CDF, RUF and AFRC trials. Many 
                                                
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., 60. 
39 Ibid., 61. 
40 Ozonnia Ojielo, “Beyond TRC: Governance in Sierra Leone,” in Rescuing a Fragile State: 
Sierra Leone 2002-2008, ed. Lansana Gberie (Waterloo: LCMSDS Press of Wilfred Laurier 
University, 2009): 50. 
41 Schabas, “A Synergistic Relationship: The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
and the Special Court for Sierra Leone,” 19. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis,” 64. 
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witnesses were called throughout the trials, a number of whom gave evidence 
anonymously behind screens.44 
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
One cannot discuss justice in Sierra Leone without looking at the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission as well. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), 
formally established July 5, 2002,45 had an ambitious mandate “to ‘create an impartial 
historical record of violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian 
law related to the armed conflict in Serra Leone’; to address impunity in the country; to 
address the causes of the conflict with a view to prevent reoccurrence; to address the 
needs of victims (especially those of children and those who had been sexually abused); 
and, to promote reconciliation.”46  The Commission was headed by Bishop Joseph 
Humper47 as Chairman and Sierra Leonean lawyer, Yasmin Jusu-Sherriff as Executive 
Secretary. Overall, the TRC was comprised of a mix of local and international 
commissioners.48 The TRC was given independent status, some financial support for 
investigations and was granted subpoena powers.49  
At first, it was thought that people would not want to talk about abuses suffered or 
admit to crimes. However, once the TRC began its work it was clear that there was a 
great need for people to be heard, have their stories recorded and have their perpetrators 
known.50 Originally, the presence of the Special Court deterred many perpetrators from 
coming forward as they were afraid that the evidence would be used at the Special Court 
                                                
44 Ibid. 
45 Ojielo, “Beyond TRC: Governance in Sierra Leone,” 43.  
46 Dugal, “‘Witness to Truth’: The TRC for Sierra-Leone – An Overview,” 29.  
47 Ibid., 30. 
48 Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis,” 62. 
49 Dugal, “‘Witness to Truth’: The TRC for Sierra-Leone – An Overview,” 29. 
50 Ibid., 30.  
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against them or their former commanders.51 As it became evident that only those at the 
top of command would be prosecuted under the Special Court, more perpetrators came to 
the TRC.52  
The TRC gathered information, had public and camera hearings (for children, 
victims of sexual abuse and certain perpetrators), and allowed perpetrators to respond to 
victim allegations when possible. However, this was rare as the accused were difficult to 
locate due to relocations and fear of retaliation.53 Special arrangements were made for the 
children’s hearings to protect their identities and ensure their well-being with 
psychological workers present.54 
Although the government created the TRC it has failed to give much attention to its 
activities, final report and recommendations.55 Many people utilized the TRC, and the 
popular experiences and airing of grievances created expectations for the future. Yet, not 
much has been done by the government with these recommendations.56 While there may 
have been some mistaken identities because of the flexibility of the TRC, information 
was gathered that would not normally come to light because of the creativity and 
protection of the TRC.57  
The TRC found that “those in leadership in government, public life and civil 
society failed the people of Sierra Leone.”58 The TRC also found that many were eager to 
                                                
51 Ibid.  
52 Ibid.  
53 Ibid., 31.  
54 Ibid., 32. 
55 Ibid., 29. 
56 Ibid., 30.   
57 Ibid., 32.  
58 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, “Chapter 2- Findings,” in Witness to 
Truth- Volume 2, (2004): 32. Accessible online at http://www.sierra-
leone.org/TRCDocuments.html.  
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blame the causes of the war on foreign elements and the search for diamonds as it took 
away blame for political failure from the elites of Sierra Leone. 59  However, the 
Commission ruled that: 
“the central cause of the war was endemic greed, corruption and nepotism that 
deprived the nation of its dignity and reduced most people to a state of poverty. 
The Commission [held] the political elite of successive regimes in the post-
independence period responsible for creating the conditions for conflict.”60 
 
Finally, and perhaps most disturbingly, the TRC held that many of the causes of the 
conflict still exist in post-war Sierra Leone, and are potential causes of future conflict if 
not addressed soon.61 
In terms of accounting for the atrocities that took place, the TRC found that 60.5% 
of the violations reported to the Commission were committed by the RUF, 9.8% by the 
AFRC, 6.8% by the SLA, 6% by the CDF, and 1.5% by the ECOMOG force.62 The TRC 
foresaw the reconciliation of Sierra Leone occurring in stages. First was the 
establishment of the Lomé Peace Agreement, creating a viable environment for 
reconciliation. Second was the moment when communities began to create activities in 
which trust could be restored. Truth telling was an important stage of this process as were 
reparations, which served as a symbolic acknowledgement of the wrongs suffered. The 
third phase would occur when Sierra Leonean citizens would forgive one another for the 
atrocities committed during the war, a process which may take decades.63 
The Relationship between the TRC and Special Court 
                                                
59 Dugal, “‘Witness to Truth’: The TRC for Sierra-Leone – An Overview,” 33. 
60 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, “Chapter 2- Findings,” 27. 
61 Ibid., 107.  
62 Ibid., 27.  
63 Ojielo, “Beyond TRC: Governance in Sierra Leone,” 51. 
10
Undergraduate Transitional Justice Review, Vol. 1 [2010], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/undergradtjr/vol1/iss2/5
 183 
While both the TRC and the Special Court attempted to investigate and understand the 
complex Sierra Leonean conflict, they did so from different perspectives. Both explained 
to the people of Sierra Leone that the bodies were not working as a single unit, but valued 
each other’s work towards post-conflict justice.64 In terms of how the TRC and Special 
Court interacted, there was confusion and disagreement about each body’s role.65 It was 
initially recommended by some that the two bodies share resources. However, once 
operational it wasn’t clear how this would be feasible given their distinct mandates and 
important independent tasks. 66  While both organizations utilized public education 
campaigns67 throughout the country to promote their functions, the TRC received more 
widespread support.68 The only significant dispute between the two bodies was over 
testimony by indicted prisoners.69 
Geoffrey Robertson, the first president of the Appeals Chamber of the Special 
Court, argues that the tribunal had a special role to play in achieving reconciliation, 
stating: 
“Within the fallible parameter of human justice, with its fundamentals of due 
process, transparency and defence of rights, we are charted to do our best to end 
the impunity that powerful perpetrators would otherwise enjoy. This much is 
owed to the memory of murdered victims, to maimed survivors and to those who 
grieve for them. It is a duty we share with another body, the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission set up by the Sierra Leone government. We shall 
work together to uncover the truth, although the Court alone has the power to 
deliver the justice that is a prerequisite for reconciliation.”70 
                                                
64Schabas, “A Synergistic Relationship: The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
and the Special Court for Sierra Leone,” 5. 
65 Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis,” 62. 
66 Schabas, “A Synergistic Relationship: The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
and the Special Court for Sierra Leone,” 29. 
67 Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis,” 62. 
68 Ibid., 63. 
69 Schabas, “A Synergistic Relationship: The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
and the Special Court for Sierra Leone,” 5.  
70 Ojielo, “Beyond TRC: Governance in Sierra Leone,” 50.  
11
Koehn: An Imperfect Body?





Criticism of the Court 
 
 Creation of the Court 
 
As previously mentioned, under the terms of the Statute, the Court would cover 
crimes from November 30, 1996, onwards71 (date of the Abidjan Peace Accord).72 
Utilizing this date, however, led many Sierra Leoneans to believe that the Court only 
cared about the people living in Freetown and the Western Area, as much of the impact 
of the war was not felt for these people until after November 1996. This further 
entrenched the divide between the capital and the rest of Sierra Leone, which dates back 
to the colonial era.73 Article 8 of this Statute enabled the Special Court to have primacy 
over the Sierra Leone national courts, which had a significant impact when Defence 
Counsel appearing before the Court said the Special Court was unconstitutional, since the 
Sierra Leone constitution states that no court can have higher judicial authority than the 
Sierra Leone Supreme Court.	  74   
 Foreign Staff 
There have been a number of criticisms regarding the court appointments, namely 
that all “senior staff at the Special Court were expatriates.”75 This has been viewed as an 
indication of a lack of respect and recognition of qualified Sierra Leoneans. Some felt 
                                                
71 Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis,” 59. 
72 Ibid., 60. 
73 Ibid.   
74 Ibid., 56. 
75 David Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone (Oxford: James Currey, 2005): 319. 
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that “[t]he Special Court does not trust Sierra Leone to administer justice. If they are not 
trusted to administer justice, how can they be expected to accept it?”76  
Further, Prosecutor Crane brought in many ex-military personnel as investigators, 
which gave the Office of the Prosecutor an American military feel.77  Crane also made 
controversial statements, such as that those indicted “would never see a free day again.” 
These statements were made before their trials even occurred.78 
 Finances of the Court 
When the Court initially began the Office of the Prosecution spent ten times more 
than the Office of the Defence and employed three times more staff. 79 The Special Court 
was also criticised for the particularly expensive cost of the Court itself, as it has spent 
150 million dollars.80 This money comes from over thirty countries with the US, UK, 
Netherlands, and Scandinavian countries as top donors.81 However, for the second 
poorest country in the world (according to the UNDP ranking), with people dying of 
malnutrition, preventable medical diseases and the aftermath of war, it would be quite 
difficult to see so much money being poured into this Special Court when the most 
horrible of people are being treated better than the country’s citizens.82 On average the 
indictments have so far cost 23 million dollars each.83   
 Length of the Operation 
                                                
76 Ibid. 
77 Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis,” 58. 
78 Ibid., 61. 
79 Ibid., 68. 
80 Ibid., 67. 
81 Ibid., 68. 
82 For example, those imprisoned by the Special Court get 3 meals and 2 snacks a day, while 
victims of the perpetrators likely have far less. Ibid., 67. 
83 Ibid., 68. 
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There have been criticisms regarding the length of time the Special Court has been 
in operation, as it was only meant to last for three years and is still running today. The 
initial three year plan was unrealistic in part because of the time it took to set up the 
Court.84 While the plan was to have the Special Court complete all trials and appeals by 
2010, it has not done so; an expert panel has predicted that the Tribunal will be “unable to 
fulfil its mission before 2016.”85  
 Legal Ramifications 
Some saw criminal prosecution, and thereby the Special Court, as a threat to peace 
and security “and a Western intrusion in African accountability mechanisms.”86 As 
previously mentioned, three of the perpetrators who were considered the “worst” were 
unable to be tried, which was a great disappointment and almost cause for dismantling 
the Special Court.87  
Many also saw the Truth and Reconciliation Commission as the more appropriate 
institution to bring peace and healing to the community.  This was supported by pointing 
to the fact that the TRC was met with more widespread support by Sierra Leoneans 
themselves.88 “The Special Court promotes reconciliation through punishment, while the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission does not punish anyone, but promotes healing.”89 
Or, as the TRC put it “[a] criminal justice body will have largely punitive and retributive 
aims, whereas a truth and reconciliation body will have largely restorative and healing 
                                                
84 Ibid. 
85 Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and 
Sierra Leone, 41. 
86 Schabas, “A Synergistic Relationship: The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
and the Special Court for Sierra Leone,” 26. 
87 Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis,” 64. 
88 Ibid., 63. 
89 Ibid. 
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objectives.”90 In addition, the TRC also had a direct impact on, and contact with, 
people’s day-to-day lives. Finally, it did not help the Special Court that the TRC was 
critical of how the Special Court allowed exceptions to the amnesty some thought they 
would be granted when signing peace treaties.91 
Arguments for the Court 
 Creation of the Court 
Fortunately for the integrity of the Special Court, the defence claims that the 
Special Court was unconstitutional were rejected.92 Also, the choice by the Court to try 
crimes from after November 1996 was not meant to be a political statement or to value 
the security of the capital over rural Sierra Leone; rather, it was a strategic decision 
intended to target crimes committed after the Abidjan Peace Accord.93 
 Foreign Staff 
With an international court, regardless of the location of the country it is hosted in, 
it is inevitable that the court staff will be mostly foreign to that country. When dealing 
with issues such as human rights and international criminal law it is best to employ the 
leaders in the field, rather than take on local citizens for the sake of placating the host 
country. Further, the situation in Sierra Leone was such that the prolonged conflict 
inevitably killed and drove away many of the people who would be most qualified to 
participate in the Court. It is important to note that Sierra Leoneans were not excluded 
from the makeup of the Court, as Bankole Thompson was appointed as a trial judge and 
                                                
90 Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Chapter 1- Executive Summary,” in Witness to Truth- 
Volume 2 (2004): 18.  
91 Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis,” 63. 
92 Ibid., 56. 
93 Ibid., 60. 
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George Gelaga King was made an appeal judge.94 Although the prosecutor ended up 
being American it was clear that the original intent was to have this role filled by an 
African.95 The deputy prosecutor was Desmond de Silva (British QC) who had been 
previously admitted to the Bar in Sierra Leone.96  
 Local Impact 
 Because the Special Court was held within the country that experienced the 
atrocities of the perpetrators, the community could feel more included in the justice 
process than in previous ad hoc tribunals. The Court made outreach very important in its 
operations with even Prosecutor Crane travelling to rural communities of Sierra Leone 
that are not easily accessible.97 The outreach by the Court was so extensive that there was 
a person designed for outreach in each of the provinces. Every Tuesday and Wednesday 
school children would be educated about the history of the conflict and the work that the 
Court was doing. The Court would reach out to the general population in a variety of 
means including setting up booths at local markets.98 NGOs such as No Peace Without 
Justice became involved in community outreach to facilitate public information and 
sensitisation on the Special Court. The outreach program worked through other local 
organizations to formulate the issues in a way that was easily understandable for the 
general public, fostering the role of civil society in promoting accountability within 
                                                
94 Ibid., 57. 
95 Ibid., 58. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Park, “Community-based restorative transnational justice in Sierra Leone,” 99. 
98 Anna Matas, “The International Criminal Court,” A lecture presented to the Canadian Center 
for International Justice’s Continuing Legal Education on Criminal and Civil Liability for Crimes 
Against Humanity, Genocide and Torture, March 5, 2011. 
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Sierra Leone.99 By having the local population able to understand and get updates on the 
trials, the Special Court could bring justice to those who needed it most: the victims. 
Because of this outreach, the citizens of Sierra Leone understand that those most 
responsible for the atrocities must be brought to justice so that the society can heal and 
look to the future. The outreach done by the Court and NGOs is the single most effective 
way of reaching the Court’s underlying goals of encouraging peace and justice in this 
fragile post conflict region. 
 Finances 
While initially there was uneven funding between the offices of the prosecutor and 
defence, it has since evened out.100 A possible explanation for this is that the prosecutor’s 
office needed the finances initially to begin investigations before the indictments could be 
announced. Once it was made public who would be charged it was then time for the 
defence office to use its resources to defend the accused; to do so before hand would have 
been impossible.  While the expense of the Court overall may seem substantial, it is 
significantly cheaper than others such as the Rwanda Tribunal, which costs 120 million 
dollars per year101  or 10 % of the UN’s overall budget for the ICTY and ICTR 
combined.102 Further, the infrastructure that the Court has set up will be able to be 
utilized by Sierra Leone once the Court has completed its work. 
 Length of the Operation 
                                                
99 No Peace Without Justice, “Preface: An overview of No Peace Without Justice activities in 
Sierra Leone,” in No Peace Without Justice- Sierra Leone Conflict Mapping, 
http://www.npwj.org/sites/default/files/documents/C-%20Preface_0.pdf (accessed March 6, 
2011). 
100 Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis,” 68. 
101 Ibid., 67. 
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When it was necessary to build a new facility, hire staff, investigate allegations, and 
allow time for defence, initial trials and appeals, it should be of little surprise that the 
Special Court is running longer then intended. It is better to have more thorough trials 
when the issues at hand are of such national and international importance rather than 
rushing through them for the sake of staying on schedule. The Court is currently in the 
midst of the complex case of Charles Taylor at The Hague; however, on the whole the 
Court is in the process of wrapping up its operations, as evidenced by the handing over of 
security responsibilities from UN Peacekeepers to the Sierra Leone Police. This step is 
significant as “the Special Court is set to become the first international tribunal to 
complete its mandate and transition to a Residual Mechanism.”103 
 Legal Ramifications 
Looking at the Special Court from a legal perspective, the Court has left, and will 
continue to leave, a positive and significant legacy on the development of law both 
nationally and internationally.  
On the national level, Antonio Cassese, UN commissioned independent expert, 
reported that the Court’s legacy includes “(a) use of the Special Court’s infrastructures; 
(b) trials by Sierra Leonean courts of international crimes committed by middle-level 
alleged perpetrators; (c) impact on the Sierra Leone legal professional and (d) training 
and redeployment of Sierra Leonean personnel that have worked for the Court.”104 By 
empowering and involving Sierra Leoneans in the international and local justice systems, 
the Court has brought real justice to the people the people of Sierra Leone. The legacy of 
                                                
103 Special Court for Sierra Leone Outreach and Public Affairs Office, “UN Hands Over Special 
Court Security to Sierra Leone Police,” February 17, 2011, 
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bringing to justice those most responsible for atrocities, building up the nation’s justice 
system, and empowering the local citizens will help to prevent future atrocities.  At a 
meeting of the UN Security Council in June 2007, the President of the Council (and 
agreeing speakers) described the Special Court as contributing to “strengthening stability 
in Sierra Leone and the sub-region and [to] bringing an end to impunity.”105 Furthermore, 
the indictments and arrest of Charles Taylor illustrated that even the most powerful 
leaders can be subject to international law.106  
On an international level, the Special Court has helped to create a “highly 
developed and sophisticated body of law, in which the definitions and scope of war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide have been explored, along with the various 
forms of participation and liability, the available excuses, justifications and defences, 
procedural matters, issues concerning the rights of the accused and the relevant 
considerations in determining appropriate penalties.”107 Notably, the Special Court was 
the first to try cases about the war crime of forced marriage,108 conscription, enlistment 
or use of child soldiers on an international level109 with the AFRC and CDF trial 
judgements.110  The RUF sentencing judgement (in April 2009) was “the first ever 
[conviction] within an international or internationalized criminal tribunal for the war 
crime of attacking personnel involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping 
                                                
105 Security Council, “UNSC Statement by the President of the Security Council,” 
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mission, and for the crimes against humanity of sexual slavery and forced marriage (as an 
inhumane act).”111 
Additionally, international criminal tribunals such as the Special Court provide a great 
deal of guidance to the International Criminal Court.112  
These significant additions to international criminal law are important not only on 
an international level, but on the domestic as well; there is evidence that international 
tribunal law is influencing national courts’ case law.113 By building on international law 
and creating precedents in emerging areas of law, such as child soldiers, the Court 
achieved significance not only for the people of Sierra Leone, whose worst criminals had 
to be brought to justice in order for the society to be able to move on, but also for an 
international community that requires guidance in trying future perpetrators of these 
crimes. Most importantly, the Special Court of Sierra Leone provided a mechanism for 
the carrying out of international legal obligations that were required by the “prosecution 
and punishment of perpetrators of serious violations of human rights.”114 No one is above 
the law, and the international community has contributed to the furthering of this 
principle by creating the Court. This illustrated to Sierra Leoneans and the world that 
what happened in Sierra Leone was recognized as unacceptable and that assistance is 
always available to help rid the world of impunity.  
Conclusion  
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It is undeniable that, in a perfect world, the Court would cost less and every person 
possible would be held accountable for their actions. Indeed, it is easy to criticize and 
find flaws, especially when there are such great expectations. However, the case of the 
Special Court of Sierra Leone demonstrates that it is important to be realistic and 
carefully weigh the positive and negative consequences. What is most important about 
the Court is its overall positive legacy, not just for international law (although clearly it is 
immense) but for the people themselves whom the Court was able to reach.  It is because 
the positives far outweigh the negatives that ad-hoc tribunals, international courts, and 
truth and reconciliation commissions must continue to exist and be used as mechanisms 
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